While the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl led to the introduction of new concepts in nuclear safety, investigations of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station disaster have not gone beyond proposals for improved safety systems, design standards, and management guidelines for severe accidents. This worrying lack of analysis suggests that the Japanese accident can be reduced to a sequence of failures.^[1](#fn1-0096340214555109){ref-type="fn"}^

An alternative approach is to take a step back and understand the event as a chain reaction that, for more than three years, has continued to trigger crises in the context of a societal emergency---for instance, critical failures of water decontamination equipment and multiple radioactive leaks. An approach that we call "engineering thinking in emergency situations" offers a new perspective on how to handle such an ongoing emergency that affects an entire society.

In the academic world, the Fukushima Daiichi accident led to the re-examination of "resilience" in the context of a long-term catastrophic event. The resilience of a system is its intrinsic ability to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following changes or disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations under both expected and unexpected conditions ([@bibr7-0096340214555109]). The ongoing events at Fukushima Daiichi demonstrate how difficult it is for an organization to transition into resilience---that is, to manage the consequences of an accident in order to increase the likelihood that the situation will be brought under control.

If organizations are to develop this capacity to adapt, their response to a threat must go beyond traditional standards-based approaches which involve prescribed functions and procedures ([@bibr6-0096340214555109]). In particular, organizations cannot assume that the availability of technical support teams or material resources that can be rapidly dispatched on-site is proof that the organization can adapt to an unexpected, long-term situation. A pertinent observation comes from [@bibr20-0096340214555109], who points out that even the guidelines for the management of severe accidents that have been developed since the Fukushima Daiichi accident are limited in their assumptions. For instance, estimates of the reaction time to recover from the failure of critical equipment might not be realistic; scenarios might not take into account areas outside the reactor containment building; and, generally speaking, the assumptions might underestimate the difficult material conditions prevailing on-site after a disaster.

At Fukushima Daiichi there are, however, encouraging signs of change: Two years after the accident, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) noted that the plant's operator (the Tokyo Electric Power Company, or TEPCO) had adopted proactive approaches to decommissioning based on innovative technologies ([@bibr8-0096340214555109]). It seems that the operator has incorporated feedback from earlier incidents and used it to improve engineering at the design stage. One battle may be won, but the war is far from over. Organizations such as TEPCO have not yet figured out how to manage "unmanageable" scenarios as they unfold. One answer may lie in the organization of the engineering activity itself.

The Fukushima emergency as engineering failure {#sec1-0096340214555109}
==============================================

The Fukushima accident began with a combination of two powerful natural phenomena: an earthquake, which triggered the automatic shutdown of the reactors and the loss of all external power supplies; and a tsunami, which then flooded generators ([@bibr12-0096340214555109]). The lack of electricity made it difficult to monitor and control the state of the reactors. On-site damage severely disrupted the operating conditions in control rooms, as well as communication between these rooms and the on-site crisis center.

Although the sequences of reactor failures were relatively independent, shift supervisors failed to transmit correct and complete information to the on-site crisis center, which led to shortcomings in overall monitoring. Consequently, reactors were left uncooled for several hours, which led to the release of significant levels of radioactive waste. The Japanese investigation highlighted shortcomings in the actions taken by the federal government, Japanese nuclear authorities, and TEPCO with respect to risk analysis, design standards, and oversight by the operator ([@bibr12-0096340214555109]).

Fukushima recovery and response {#sec2-0096340214555109}
===============================

Since the disaster, about 800 cubic meters of contaminated cooling water are pumped from the reactors every day ([@bibr11-0096340214555109]); some of this water is stored in temporary reservoirs that are not always completely watertight. A decontamination system to remove radionuclides was developed but has proven extremely unreliable. To sustain reactor cooling over the long term, the IAEA recommended that TEPCO study the conditions for a controlled discharge of some of the stored water into the ocean ([@bibr8-0096340214555109]).

In December 2011, the operator issued a mid- and long-term post-disaster recovery plan that was approved by the Japanese government and has since been updated ([@bibr19-0096340214555109]). This plan proposes the removal of fuel from the spent fuel pool of Reactor 4 prior to plant decommissioning. At the same time, a research and development program has been established to provide scientific support for waste treatment activities ([@bibr8-0096340214555109]). Work has already begun on the dismantling of fuel rods and is expected to continue for another year. It is a dangerous job, given how little is known about the state of the fuel rods.

To make matters worse, nobody is quite sure whether the Japanese public will support decommissioning, given the repeated malfunctions, the uncontrolled high level of contamination on-site and in surrounding areas, and the failure of water decontamination systems. In the midst of this ongoing emergency, TEPCO is carrying out an intense program of on-site activities. The aim is to contain radioactive pollution, regain control of the facilities, and complete decommissioning by the year 2050.

Elsewhere, members of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) have carried out their own safety studies designed to take into account "beyond-design" and multiple-failure scenarios. NEA member states concluded from these studies that there was no imminent risk to their operating facilities. Although the [@bibr13-0096340214555109] reaffirmed the validity of the defense-in-depth concept---which uses multiple independent and redundant safety systems to protect against failures and unanticipated events---it is clear that the concept needs a lot more work if it is to be effectively implemented. All that has been learned so far is that specific safety systems should be strengthened to bolster safety margins in exceptional circumstances.

The role of engineering {#sec3-0096340214555109}
=======================

Engineering usually encompasses the many and varied aspects of an industrial project (technical, economic, financial, and social). By extension, it refers to the study of, or activities concerned with, the modification or development of technical applications that correspond to a scientific field of knowledge. A particular additional feature of nuclear engineering is that quality control standards are extremely high ([@bibr4-0096340214555109]). [@bibr9-0096340214555109] proposed a definition of the "engineering method" as a strategy that would offer the best possible change using the available resources in a poorly understood or uncertain situation. Given the constraints, it is no surprise that engineers can only provide approximate answers; ultimately, society decides whether the outcome is a good one.

Time management underlies many definitions of engineering. In a nuclear crisis, time is an indicator of an emergency situation. [@bibr18-0096340214555109] and [@bibr2-0096340214555109] argue that emergencies reflect a twofold reality: a scenario with adverse consequences is very likely in the short term; and only swift action and the massive mobilization of resources may prevent damage.

Organizations affected by emergencies are largely based on ritualized processes, fragmented knowledge, and a division of labor and skills---and they are made up of people who may have differing opinions on what constitutes an emergency. Consequently, their decisions are open to challenge, both from within the organization and from external groups ([@bibr1-0096340214555109]).

Thinking in an emergency {#sec4-0096340214555109}
========================

Engineering project managers are in the hot seat. Their subjective understanding of an emergency has to respond to three equally important objectives: meeting deadlines (when the threat is imminent), finding effective and reliable solutions that reduce risk, and avoiding the creation of new risks. Engineers faced with an emergency have several problems to solve: They don't know the full extent of the situation.They face a critical lack of resources, especially technical knowledge and practical know-how. If the environment becomes hostile (in the context of a disaster, for instance), this only gets worse.Society expects a lot from them. Deadlines must be met, and solutions must be found.

Solutions based on only one of these constraints can be incompatible, and decision makers are often slow to adapt when they have to make changes to their initial strategy ([@bibr15-0096340214555109]). At the same time, decision makers don't care for innovation when the risks are high ([@bibr3-0096340214555109]), despite the fact that uncertainty offers an opportunity to explore new avenues.

"Engineering thinking in emergency situations" therefore describes the difficult activities that engineers have to conduct, with limited resources, in an emergency that affects the general population. What is an emergency? At a minimum, it describes the tension between society's high expectations that a solution can be found, and a lack of readily available resources in an uncertain situation. We therefore define engineering thinking in emergency situations as ([@bibr5-0096340214555109]): *Engineering activities that are significantly impeded due to a lack of resources in the face of a societal emergency*.

At its simplest, engineering thinking in an emergency situation is an extreme case of engineering. However, when it is used as a crisis management strategy, the goal is to foster the ability to innovate, through specific organizational changes that increase adaptability and resilience.

Adaptable organizations {#sec5-0096340214555109}
=======================

Effective engineering thinking in emergency situations is measured by the ability of an organization, in a crisis, to modify its working practices and provide technical solutions that meet the expectations of society. This requires a radical rethinking of how engineering activities are organized.

The conventional solution, which takes the form of a project framework (including planning and control processes that are materialized by "tools" and "users") working within a known timescale, isn't much use in an emergency. A more helpful framework introduces the concept of a "temporary" organization ([@bibr10-0096340214555109]). In itself, the concept of "organization" reflects the "expectations-actions-learning" loops found in interactions between individuals in working situations ([@bibr14-0096340214555109]). Furthermore, incorporating social acceptability into engineering not only increases community involvement but also integrates the activity into its environment by a redefinition of its goals.

A good example of this comes from Fukushima Daiichi, where none of the various systems that were implemented to treat contaminated water were considered adequate. Engineers could not see beyond a set of "target rates" for water decontamination. Alternatively, the objectives of the engineering activity could have been expanded to take into account the expectations of the affected populations. The target rates could then have been defined accordingly, thus opening up the option of discharging waste into the sea. Expanding the objectives of the activity poses new challenges, so the temporary organization must make it possible for new resources to emerge, and must promote innovation in order to meet the expectations of society.

Traditionally, emergency management has consisted of the deployment of technical resources and the application of established procedures. Engineering thinking in emergency situations goes far beyond this. It looks for ways to reconfigure the organization of engineering activities and associated management tools, depending on immediate needs. It can include changes to decision-making procedures or the redistribution of roles within the organization. In exceptionally severe situations, it may even involve deviating from legal requirements when they are clearly not in the public interest and limit the capacity of the organization to adapt.

Engineering thinking in emergency situations cannot happen if the organization is not adaptable. Adaptability can be assessed using three criteria: the organization's ability to widen the scope of its activities and goals to include the expectations of civil society; its ability to temporarily change its structure to achieve these reformulated goals; and its capacity, through this new structure, to promote innovation that supplies resources. Organizations that can fulfill these criteria can quickly transition into resilience in a catastrophic situation. But, to be fully effective, organizations need a broader conceptual framework for safety management.

Resilience as a new safety requirement {#sec6-0096340214555109}
======================================

No matter how many disasters there are, and no matter how much experience is gained, standards will never be infallible ([@bibr17-0096340214555109]). It is difficult to provide an exhaustive description of dysfunctional scenarios, and easy to overestimate the performance of agents in a crisis ([@bibr13-0096340214555109]).

Paradoxically, deterministic approaches to safety that attempt to anticipate every outcome can actually make a crisis more dramatic: When the aim is to create order, disorder is destabilizing. The transition to resilience requires a quick switch to an adaptive operating mode, which may imply the reconfiguring of the organization and its decision-making strategies in order to optimize the availability of resources. Indeed, when the survival of critical infrastructure such as nuclear reactors is threatened, effective solutions must be found even though significant resources have been destroyed by the accident. This raises the vision of a future in which nuclear safety oversight authorities require operators to demonstrate their ability to implement an effective engineering thinking strategy in an emergency situation and, more generally, to demonstrate their capacity (skills, expertise, methods, etc.) to ensure a rapid transition into resilience.

Fukushima Daiichi provides good examples of what happens when the resilience approach is not followed. On a small scale, when they were faced with the loss of electrical power and the subsequent impossibility of activating relief valves, workers found it difficult to set up new power sources such as mobile generators and car batteries. As a result, the cores of the reactors were left uncooled for several hours and started to melt down.

On a bigger scale, engineering makes a significant contribution to disaster management---whether through the restoration of functions necessary to operate reactors, or the design of ways to handle contaminated waste. On the other hand, a delay or failure in the execution of engineering work can be an aggravating factor in a crisis, as it generates new risks and erodes public confidence.

Beyond traditional safety models {#sec7-0096340214555109}
================================

The situation at Fukushima Daiichi has highlighted a potential new function of engineering. A topical example is the work being done to decontaminate the large volumes of cooling water injected into the reactors. Traditionally, safety has been framed by standards developed in the design stages of a project. However, there is also an opportunity for engineering thinking in emergency situations to enhance safety and contain risks in an organization that has had its key functions destroyed. Critical to this end is how to integrate a social dimension into engineering activity and move it beyond an essentially technical, number-crunching exercise. Temporary organizational change must also provide a managerial framework that encourages innovation in an emergency. This is a strategic challenge, because effective engineering thinking in emergency situations can accelerate the transition into resilience for a system that has been overwhelmed by a disaster.

Practical considerations about how to achieve resilience through appropriate organization raise questions about resilience itself. Thinking about resilience implies the modeling of changes to the system facing an emergency. This is where traditional safety models break down. Although they offer some help in describing hazardous scenarios and outlining measures to prevent failures from propagating, they cannot represent the state of the system or changes to it, particularly in the context of a long-term emergency that continues even after natural disasters and official crisis periods have come to an end. This may be why it is difficult to measure the full extent of events at Fukushima Daiichi.

The shortcomings of traditional frameworks should not be used as an excuse to underestimate problems---a phenomenon that is particularly evident in assessments of the epidemiological consequences of nuclear accidents ([@bibr16-0096340214555109]). A new conceptual framework is needed to fully measure the impact of the events that have unfolded since March 2011, and to find better ways to think about the "never-ending" disaster.
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